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In the paper we discuss China's participation in both the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations on a post-Kyoto
global climate change regime currently under way and out beyond Copenhagen in further negotiations
likely to follow. China is now both the largest and most rapidly growing carbon emitter, and has much
higher emission intensity relative to GDP than OECD countries. In the Copenhagen negotiation, there
will be strong pressure on China to take on emissions reduction commitments and China's concern
will be to do so in ways that allow continuation of a high growth rate and fast development. Central
to this will be maintaining access to OECD markets for manufactured exports in face of potential environmental
protectionism. Thus the broad approach seems likely to be to take on environmental commitments
in part in return for stronger guarantees of access to export markets abroad. This involves directly
linked trade and environmental commitments although how linkage can be made explicit is a major
issue. More narrowly, the issues that seem likely to dominate the climate change negotiating agenda
from China's viewpoint are the interpretation of the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)
principle adopted in Kyoto, the choice of negotiating instruments and form of emission commitments,
and the size (and form) of accompanying financial funds for adaptation and innovation. We suggest
that a possible interpretation of CBDR reflecting China's desire to leave room to grow when undertaking
emission reduction commitments might be for China to take on emission intensity commitments while
OECD countries take on emission level commitments. Larger funds and flexibility in their use will
also raise China's willingness to make commitments.
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A central element in global policy coordination over the next 20-30 years will 
almost certainly be both the design and implementation of post-Kyoto arrangements 
aiming to mitigate climate change. In the shorter term, these are to be negotiated by 
the Committee of Parties (COP15) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) with the negotiating process to conclude in Copenhagen in 
November 2009. In the 2007 Bali meeting that launched this second round of global 
climate change negotiations (after Kyoto in 1997), four negotiation areas of mitigation, 
adaptation, innovation, and trade and finance were agreed on. The participation of 
China both in this process and beyond is the focus of this paper.   
China did not participate in the earlier 1997 Kyoto negotiations, and faces 
decisions as to how actively and on what basis to involve herself in this second 
negotiating round of climate change mitigation initiatives. China is still a low income 
(even if rapidly growing) country, and the primary policy emphasis remains on 
achieving growth and development and accompanying poverty elimination for the 
bottom deciles of the Chinese population. China sees her need as having global 
environmental arrangements in place that allow her to continue to grow, and key to 
this is maintaining openness in the global economy, and without environmentally 
motivated trade restrictions, so as to allow for continued high export growth and 
continuing FDI inflows as she and others take on environmental commitments.   
At the same time, China faces pressure to take on commitments as the largest and 
most rapidly growing global emitter and there is growing recognition in China of the 
potential damage China faces from climate change. China also has a significantly 
larger share of GDP originating in emissions intensive manufactures and relatively 
inefficient small coal burning power plants. China also has opportunities to influence 
the outcomes of negotiations through coalitional activities with other lower income 
and large population partners (India, Russia, and Brazil). Also the choice of approach 
to the negotiations through the selection of negotiating instruments, dealing with 
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exports will be critical.   
The negotiating agenda agreed in Bali for conclusion in Copenhagen is 
simultaneously extremely ambitious, vague and highly imprecise, and the time frame 
for negotiation is short. For China, four issues seem likely to dominate the narrower 
climate change negotiating agenda outside the broader trade linkage issues. One is the 
interpretation of the common but differentiated responsibilities principle agreed in the 
Kyoto negotiation for non-OECD economies. Here compensation and the form and 
depth of emission reduction commitments enter as issues. A second is the choice of 
negotiating instrument, with issues of negotiation on emission intensity rather than 
emission level and embedment of emissions in exports. A third issue is the size and 
form of the funds that will likely be created to facilitate adaptation and innovation. A 
final issue is how to deal with non-compliance by key OECD countries with their 
Kyoto commitments, which weakens the credibility of any commitments that might 
now be made by OECD countries in a second round of global negotiations. China’s 
interest is in dealing with Kyoto non-compliance through firmer environmental 
dispute resolution for new Copenhagen commitments. 
We suggest that a possible compromise interpretation of the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle allowing negotiation to progress and reflecting 
China’s desire to leave room to grow when undertaking emission reduction 
commitments might be for China (along with India, Russia, and Brazil) to take on 
emission intensity commitments while OECD countries take on emission level 
commitments. Non-compliance with Kyoto commitments seemingly implies both 
carrying forward and combining of levels of non-compliance from Kyoto into the post 
Bali Copenhagen agreements and even beyond, but now with new firmer dispute 
resolution and enforcement procedures. The size and form of accompanying financial 
funds (for adaptation and innovation) are also key to China, and firmer arrangements 
here also seem key. 
It is clear that China now sees significant direct environmental benefit at home 
from climate change mitigation and wishes to continue high growth without adverse 
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participation in global Copenhagen negotiations, but China’s other interests in 
maintaining openness and growth will be equally, if not more, important. China 
differs sharply from the OECD countries in having much smaller cumulative 
emissions, not having been a party to the first Kyoto negotiating round, having 
potential coalitional partners outside the OECD, having high growth which is to be 
maintained if development goals are to be met, and sharply higher emissions 























  42.  Where current global environmental negotiations stand 
Current climate change negotiations on a post-Kyoto world are driven by the 
global growth of concern over the last few decades both broadly over environmental 
issues and more specifically over climate change. In the immediate post World War 
II period when our present global economic architecture was shaped, only trade and 
finance issues entered debate since countries were seen as only linked by trade and 
finance, not physically. Environmental policy concerns did not centrally emerge 
until the 1960’s, and then only as localized domestic issues with Rachael Carson’s 
book Silent Spring (1962).  
In the 1980’s international environmental issues, in the form of ozone holes, 
CFCs, and early concerns over global warming began to shape the global negotiating 
agenda. These issues, in turn, were to lead to discussion of sustainability in 
developmental policies and to the Brundtland Report of 1987, and the Rio Earth 
Summit of 1991.   
It was at the Rio summit that the present UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was adopted which, through the resulting joint commitment by 
all UN members to discuss carbon emission mitigation, was to provide the 
negotiating mandate for the subsequent Kyoto Protocol detailing arrangements on 
climate change mitigation out to 2012. Under UNFCCC auspices, the Bali 
conference of December 2007 initiated negotiations on Post-Kyoto climate change 
arrangements, and these negotiations are now under way following a negotiating 
mandate adapted in Bali widely referred to as the Bali roadmap. These negotiations 
are to conclude in Copenhagen in November 2009, with a midterm meeting in 
November 2008 at Potsdam.   
China along with most other developing countries did not participate in the 
Kyoto negotiations and took on no environmental commitments as part of the Kyoto 
agreements. Russia was the notable exception. A principle labeled common but 
differentiated responsibilities covering the developing countries and giving them 
imprecisely defined rights to special treatment in global environmental negotiation 
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interpreted as agreement that developing countries would take on no commitments, 
and effectively not directly participate in negotiation. Their participation was indirect 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allowing them to sell emissions 
reduction rights to producers in developed countries. But for Copenhagen the 
participation of larger developing countries (especially China) is key, and so the 
interpretation of this principle will be central to the negotiation. 
 
2.1 The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 
Even though China did not formally participate in Kyoto, the central building 
block for the post Bali process is the set of agreements arrived at in the Protocol. The 
Kyoto agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions worldwide were agreed to at a 
1997 UN conference in Kyoto, Japan and came into force in February 2005. A total of 
174 nations ratified the Protocol, but only a subset of countries (mainly developed 
plus Russia) took on commitments. Importantly for the present discussion, China took 
on no commitments to emission reductions.     
Under an agreed principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities 
(CBDR)
2”, the Kyoto Protocol effectively divided the world into two groups: one 
largely of developed countries who accepted mutual responsibility for reduction in 
carbon emissions
3, and one of largely developing countries who, in an ill-defined 
sense , were granted rights to growth and development (again in some ill-defined 
sense) over any responsibility they took on for emission reductions. There was no 
precise statement of the principle or relative weighting on these two components 
(Yoshiro, 2002). 
  The Protocol also developed three “flexibility mechanisms”: Emissions 
Trading
4, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
5. 
                                                 
2 See the discussion in section 4 for some details. 
3 The protocol required signatory developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions below the levels 
specified for each of them in the Treaty by 2012. These targets were to be met within a five-year time 
frame between 2008 and 2012, and yielded a total global cut in GHG emissions of 5% relative to a 
baseline of 1990.   
4 Kyoto is a 'cap and trade' system that imposes national caps on the emissions of Annex I (developed 
  6These so-called market-based mechanisms allow Annex I countries to meet their 
greenhouse gas emission commitments in part by purchasing GHG emissions credits. 
These can be bought either on financial exchanges, from projects which reduce 
emissions in non-Annex I economies under the CDM, from other Annex I countries 
under the JI, or from Annex I countries with excess allowances. Only CDM executive 
board-accredited Certified Emission Reductions (CER) can be bought and sold in this 
way. These mechanisms were aimed to identify the lowest-cost opportunities 
for reducing emissions and attract private sector participation in emission reduction 
efforts. Developing countries were thought to benefit through technology transfer and 
investment under collaboration with OECD countries. Whether all these mechanisms 
remain in their current form in a post Kyoto arrangement is a Bali roadmap 
negotiating issue. 
An important feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it represents only weak 
international disciplines (Walsh and Whalley, 2008). This is because it has weak 
enforcement mechanisms, effectively no dispute resolution
6, and no joint mechanism 
to deal with noncompliance. Unlike WTO agreements which cover complaints of 
violation though notation, dispute resolution procedures, and (if necessary) retaliation 
though withdrawal of equivalent concessions, Kyoto has no such structure.     
                                                                                                                                            
plus Russia) countries. Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol covers emissions trading among Annex I 
countries. Any Party included in Annex I may transfer or acquire from any other Party emission 
reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing emissions or enhancing emissions removals 
by carbon sinks, provided that: any project has the approval of the Parties involved and any such 
project provides a reduction in emissions, or an enhancement of removals by sinks that is additional to 
any that would otherwise occur. The aim is that acquisition of emission reduction units shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting reduction commitments. 
5 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects are sources of Kyoto 
emission reduction credits. The CDM is a scheme for encouraging Annex I countries to carry out 
emission reduction projects in developing countries by providing credit for “certified emission 
reductions” which can be used to meet the Annex I countries’ commitments. JI allows project-specific 
credits to be gained from existing credits obtained within Annex I countries. CDM projects produce 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), and JI projects produce Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). 
CERs/ERUs are overwhelmingly bought from project developers by funds or individual entities, rather 
than being exchange-traded allowances.   
6 The legal structure is that under the Protocol's dispute settlement provision, states are free to settle 
disputes by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their own choice. If the dispute is not settled by 
negotiation, and if the parties have not agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) or arbitration, either party may request the convening of a conciliation commission, which can 
give a non-binding recommendation. Disputes arising in the course of flexibility mechanism 
transactions, however, are likely to involve private entities and fall outside these provisions.  
  7Kyoto also differs from WTO agreements in being the outcome of a 
cross-country internalization negotiation which focused on offers to reduce emissions 
by countries conditional upon the actions of other countries. Once proposed actions of 
all parties are mutually agreed to, joint action can then proceed either globally as a 
whole or sub-globally for a subset of countries. Given that for most countries, the 
benefits of their own emission reduction efforts accrue to residents of other countries, 
how to deal with non-participants, how to enforce agreements and how to provide for 
modification of agreements in light of change remain as unresolved issues.   
One can thus be skeptical of the ability of the post Bali process to yield further 
substantive and enforceable international disciplines if it only seeks to build narrowly 
on the Kyoto agreements. Whether the Kyoto Protocol represents a first step along a 
path which will yield even more significant emission mitigation, or whether other 
negotiating routes may need to be explored in the longer run is hence a key issue. For 
China, the issue this raises from a Copenhagen negotiating stand point is how far to 
seek to build on the initial cooperation established in Kyoto since focal points for 
cooperation are different to establish, and thus how far and how quickly to try to 
move the process down wholly new and different routes requires delicate judgment of 
what is feasible to negotiate.   
 
2.2 The Post-Bali roadmap process 
The 2007 Bali meeting held as a conference of the parties (COP13) to the 
UNFCCC was designed to shape a two-year negotiating process to finalize 
arrangements for a post-2012 climate change regime. These negotiations are to 
conclude by the end of 2009. Bali thus marked the start of a road aimed to lead (via 
Poznan, Poland in December 2008 and COP14) to Copenhagen in December 2009 
and decisions and agreements for an as yet to be specified period beyond the 2012 
Kyoto  commitments.   
The elements of the Bali agreement (UNFCC, 2008) define both the key 
negotiation areas and building-blocks for a potential global post-2012 treaty 
arrangement. In contrast to the Kyoto process, the ‘Bali Roadmap’ process involves a 
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under the Convention”. It is this group which has identified the key elements of 
mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing for the Copenhagen negotiation.   
Discussions in Bali on mitigation produced no agreement on the continued use of 
previous mechanisms to achieve the mitigation objectives, but the phraseology of 
deep and significant reductions was agreed. Adaptation was seen as necessary to 
strengthen the ability of markets to respond to the impacts of the worst case scenario 
impacts of climate change. Mitigation and adaptation were seen as complementing 
each other, and if pursued together could significantly reduce the risks of adverse 
climate change impacts. Basic research, technology development and transfer of 
technology were thought needed to play a major role in improving the ability of 
nations to adapt. And adaptation and clean technology were, in turn, to be dealt with 
by establishing new international funds, whose size, function and oversight were not 
specified. The finance component of negotiation was to build on estimates of global 
financial flows supposedly needed to finance climate change initiatives, but how these 
flows were to be achieved was not specified. 
Bali also produced two further decisions. One was the adoption of an adaptation 
fund to provide funding to the most vulnerable countries to help them adapt to the 
inevitable impacts of climate change in the near term, and an agreement on a system 
of payments for the conservation of tropical forests by developing countries. These 
decisions effectively establish financial transfers as a supporting mechanism for 
global agreements to climate change reduction, a key development for a Chinese point 
of view.   
The post-Bali process faces several challenges relevant to China. One lies in the 
assignment of property rights, a general externality issue now applied to global 
warming. This issue centers on who has the right to do what remaining carbon 
emissions. Do developing countries have overriding rights to development and 
poverty alleviation and hence should be compensated for restraint they take on 
through environmental commitments or are decisions to undertake global 
responsibilities equally accepted by all, so that all must alleviate damage no matter 
  9how rich or poor. These property right issues are central to both China and the global 
negotiating process since developing countries have in the past been forceful in 
stating their rights to growth and development over responsibility for emission 
reductions, and their view that the emissions currently affecting global climate have 
been largely discharged by developed countries over the past 200 or so years since the 
industrial revolution began.   
In addition to the issue of property rights there are the issues of free riding and 
coalition activity in these negotiations. Barrett (2007) notes that small countries have 
few incentives to agree to emission cuts that constrain their economy activities if the 
direct benefits are small and larger countries agree on arrangements mutual reductions. 
This generates incentives for free riding and incentives for sub-groups of countries to 
agree independently of others, as happened in the 1997 Kyoto negotiation.   
As a result, coalitional activity will likely be central to the post Bali process and 
how China positions herself will be pivotal. The 48 countries comprising the Least 
Developed Countries (LCD) in the UN have been active in climate change negotiation. 
The fifteen members of the EU also agree common positions in negotiation. China 
thus has an incentive to explore coalitional activity with other rapidly growing large 
population low wage economies including India, Russia, and Brazil.   
How final decisions can realistically be reached in this post Bali negotiation in 
the timeframe is a further issue. In the case of WTO, closure has effectively been 
achieved in pre Doha rounds by the granting of time-linked fast-track authority by the 
US congress to the executive branch. Negotiating activity is thus granted along with 
the clear understanding that termination of fast-track negotiating authority will cease 
and should negotiations continue beyond a specified deadline. No such similar 
structure or timeframe exists for the post Bali process. The declaration launching 
negotiations in Bali expressed the hope of completion in two years, but the absence of 
a mechanism for forcing a decision is notable.   
There is also an issue of whether post Bali negotiations can realistically take 
place solely between nation states. This is because of heterogeneity within nation 
  10states by region and across firms and even across sub-regional group in terms of their 
differences in impacts which will occur within countries. 
All of these issues will arise in the post-Bali process and suggest careful 
consideration of the best approach to each by China in moving forward towards a new 
global environmental negotiation defining a post-Bali world. However, establishing 
and building on a focal point of cooperation in international negotiation is both 
difficult and time consuming, and 2007-2009 is a very short timeframe for negotiation 
with a mandate as extensive as the Bali roadmap. China is a key part of this process, 





















  113.  China’s broader objectives in global environmental negotiations   
China is a rapidly growing, large population and relatively low wage economy 
which has in the last two decades become heavily trade and FDI dependent. WTO 
data (WTO trade profiles statistics, 2008) show the share of imports and exports 
combined relative to GDP in China as 69% in 2006, up from 49 % in 2000. China’s 
exports are growing at approximately 30% per year, as are imports. Foreign invested 
enterprises (financed by FDI flows) account for 60% of both exports and imports, and 
also account for over one half of all OECD FDI flows to non-OECD countries. 
China’s position in global climate change negotiation therefore has to been seen in 
light of the need perceived by Chinese policymakers to continue her ever deeper 
integration into the global economy as a prime driver of future growth and ultimately 
further poverty alleviation.   
China’s global environmental negotiating objectives can thus be discussed both 
narrowly in terms of the details of any environmental commitments that may be 
undertaken both by China and by other countries, and also more broadly in how non 
environmental developmental objectives for China may be impacted. China’s 
objectives in current and prospective future global environmental climate change 
negotiations will thus reflect both narrower special characteristics of China’s climate 
change situation and also China’s broad developmental aims.   
Chinese policy makers clearly see China as following a long term high growth 
trajectory which is to lead to significant poverty alleviation and improved well being 
for the majority of China’s population. Any commitments made by China in a global 
climate change negotiation will thus inevitably be crafted as far as possible to allow 
for continued high growth performance. This objective is the central friction between 
China’s negotiating strategy for a post Bali world and OECD objectives, in large part 
because of the numerical implications of China’s growth.   
China has experienced a 4 fold increase in GDP/ Capita since 1978 and 10% 
growth between 2000 and 2050 implies a 30 fold increase in GDP/capita. This 
inevitably implies a very large increase in Chinese emissions if high growth continues, 
  12even if the effects of growth on emissions are partially affected by more efficient coal 
burning, major adoption of renewables, energy conservation and other measures. The 
dilemma for China is that her large manufacturing sector activity already makes China 
the largest incremental source of emission globally, even before future growth is 
factored in.   
China accounted for 17.5% of global CO2 emissions in 2004, second only to the 
US of 22.0 % (see Table 1). China will seemingly inevitably pass the United States in 
a few years and become the largest country emitter by 2010(also Table 1). This will 
likely occur even if major conservation measures are introduced. Between 1990 and 
2004, China’s carbon emissions increased by 108% percent reflecting strong 
economic growth, and China substantially underperforms the OECD countries in 
terms of emission intensity (emission /GDP) by a large margin, although this gap is 
significantly reduced by using Chinese GDP in US$ at PPP exchange rates rather than 
at current rates, also emissions intensity measures are falling much faster in China 
than in the OECD (see Table 2). 
 
Table 1 Relative Annual CO2 Emissions by Country (1990-2030)
7  
(% of worldwide emissions) 
 
  1990  2004 2010 2020 2030 
United States  23.5%  22.0%  20.1%  18.8%  18.5% 
OECD Europe  19.3%  16.3%  14.6%  12.4%  10.9% 
Japan 4.8%  4.7%  4.1%  3.5%  3.0% 
China 10.5%  17.5%  21.1%  23.9%  26.2% 
India 2.7%  4.1%  4.2%  4.7%  5.0% 





                                                 
7 See Cass (2007) Table 8 




% change in emission 
(CO2 only)   
1990-2004 
GHG Intensity 
(Tons of CO2 eq./ 
$mil. GDP-PPP) 
2000 
% change in intensity 
(CO2 only) 
1990-2002 
% change in 
GDP 
1990-2002 
Ukraine -47.1%  2369  -6  -50 
Russia -24.8%  1817  -5  -26 
Germany -12.2%  471  5  37 
EU-25 1.6%  449  -23  27 
U.S. 19.8%  720  -17  42 
Brazil 67.8%  679  17  35 
India 87.5%  768  -9  87 
China 108.3%  1023  -51  205 
Notes: GHG intensity covers emissions from six gases. GHG intensity and CO2 intensity exclude CO2 from 
international bunker fuels and land use change and forestry. GDP is measured in terms of PPP 
(constant 2000 international dollars). 
Source: Cass (2007) and World Resources Institute (WRI), 2005   
China’s 11
th five year plan (2006-2010) set out targets for a minimum annual 
growth rate of 7.5 percent for the national economy, a doubling of GDP and a 20 
percent reduction in energy consumption over 5 years. Ecological and environmental 
degradation is also to be curbed, and the emissions of major pollutants reduced by 
10%. In cities, 70% of wastewater and 60% of residential garbage are to be treated. 
Forest coverage rate is expected to reach 20%. 100 million rural residents will be 
provided access to safe drinking water, and 1.2 million kilometers of rural roads will 
be newly built and upgraded. Most towns and administrative villages will be given 
access to highways. China’s development plans thus already embody some degree of 
environmental restraint, but China’s modernization and development will nonetheless 
increase emissions levels. 
More broadly, China’s growth blueprint has been characterized by two steps: 
Step one was quadruple 1980 GNP by the end of 1990s. This was fulfilled by 1995. 
Step two was to raise per-capita GNP to the level of a medium-developed countries by 
                                                 
8 See Cass (2007) Table 5 and also see WRI 2005, Chapter 5 Figure 5.1. 
  14the mid-21st century. The Asian Development Bank forecast that China will be the 
world’s largest economy, surpassing the U.S. by 2025(Asian Development Bank, 
2007).  
This growth performance implies that there have to be large major reductions in 
emissions intensity in China to offset the effects of growth on emissions. This 
seemingly needs to occur through the use of relatively more efficient coal burning 
power plants, and significant moves to renewables and nuclear.   
When China first entered Climate Change Negotiations in 1990, China made no 
offers to take on emissions reduction commitments. Since then, China’s attitude 
towards international climate negotiations has become more proactive. Abatement 
costs, ecological vulnerability and principles of equity are now major points of 
internal debate on China’s position (Zhang Haibin, 2006). If negotiations help to 
reduce China’s abatement costs or helps make emission reductions possible, then 
China will adopt a more cooperative approach. The stress in Chinese debate is on 
accompanying transfer of technology and funds for innovation and adaptation along 
with emissions reduction commitments.   
China also accepts that she has to achieve a balance between future growth on 
the one hand and the reality of being the largest emitter of carbon globally on the 
other hand. China likely will seek to maintain its high growth opportunity by stressing 
negotiation on emission intensity reductions rather than emission levels and also 
raising further carbon embedment issue. The treatment of emissions associated with 
Chinese exports.   
China’s size and influence in the G77 also makes it a key country in global 
climate negotiations from a coalitional perspective. As the world’s largest developing 
economy and with an influential voice in the United Nations, China will play an 
important role in leading developing countries in shaping a future climate regime. 
China will see it as inevitable that environmental commitments are made as a part of 
global rule regime going beyond the trade and finance components of the 1944 Breton 
Woods’ arrangement to now span trade, environment and finance. But maintaining 
openness in the trade regime so as to prevent closure of markets to China on 
  15environmental grounds, as with carbon linked border tax adjustment prepossess will 
be key to China.     
An equally central part of the negotiation strategy for China will be the 
interpretation of the CBDR commitment undertaken by developed countries as part of 
the Kyoto negotiations. There are different interpretations of this principle, and the 
Kyoto text is unfortunately vague in its strategy. But this principle will almost 
certainly be appealed to support augments that China should take on different forms 
of commitments from those undertaken by the OECD.   
For now, the internal debate in China on climate change negotiation positions is 
still distinct from debate on domestic policy issues, and has yet to forcefully enter 
discussion on developmental priorities for China. But development priorities will 
nonetheless likely frame the climate change debate in China, and with China’s 
increasing emissions and its position as a growing global economy, the pressure will 
also be on China to take on commitments. The likely outcome will be China taking on 
a more active and positive role in climate change negotiations, which may then also 





  164  Key negotiation issues for China in Copenhagen 
We now turn to more in depth discussion of key negotiating issues in Copenhagen 
stressing China’s interest in each.   
 
4.1 The interpretation of common but different responsibilities   
In the Kyoto negotiations, common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) 
ended up being interpreted as non-participation by developing countries in global 
emission commitments, even though the principle lacked a specific statement. In the 
Copenhagen negotiation, the expectation is that there will be active participation by 
China, along with India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia and other larger low wage rapidly 
growing economies. CBDR will be taken by them as a prior core principle that these 
countries will participate in ways different from higher wage OECD countries, but 
exactly what these differences will be remains to be determined. The interpretation of 
CBDR that is agreed by parties to the negotiation is therefore the key to China’s 
participation in the post Bali process. 
CBDR as a principle has origins in terms of reference of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development Convenes (UNCED). Principle 7 of the 
1990 Rio Declaration simply states that “in view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed 
countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable 
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command”. This statement also finds its echo in 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 in Article 3, 4 
and 12, and also reflected in Kyoto Protocol Article 10 with the acknowledgements 
that (1) the largest part of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases 
originate in developed countries; (2) per capita emissions in developing countries are 
still relatively low, and (3) the share of global emissions originating in developing 
countries will grow but this is an inevitable accompaniment to their social and 
development needs. 
  17This concept is somewhat analogous to the concept of special and differential 
treatment (SPT) for developing countries in the charter of WTO which first came into 
the GATT in 1960s. In those days, the trade and trade policy problems of developing 
countries were seen as common to all developing countries but different from those of 
developed countries, motivating special elements in the international trade rule regime 
in the GATT. These involved special rights for developing countries to protect other 
own industries and preferential rights of access to developed country’s market. This in 
turn led to special rules for developing countries within the GATT (and later WTO 
rule regime (Whalley, 1990).   
However, the analog of CBDR has not been clearly defined in term of elements 
of a climate change rule regime, other than in its initial Kyoto interpretation of 
non-participation. The principle only loosely embodies asymmetric responsibilities 
and participation without spelling out specifics and as a result there has been ongoing 
debate surrounding its interpretation. 
Two different broad interpretations of CBDR currently circulate for the post Bali 
negotiation. One is that developing countries have rights to development and that they 
should receive financial compensation for any restraint on their growth and 
development that is implied by climate change commitments. The second is that the 
form of commitments should be different for developing countries compared to 
developed countries. Both interpretations can simultaneously apply in negotiation.   
The concept is also discussed in Yoshiro (2002) in term of double standards in 
favor of developing countries, and the responsibility of developed countries to assist 
developing countries. Double standards in this context imply different environmental 
commitments for developed and developing countries. These may involve different 
rights and obligations, and timing in the application of disciplines, giving more 
flexibility for developing countries in negotiation. “Double standards” also involved 
developed countries agreement in Kyoto to assist developing countries’ development. 
Yoshiro argues that such assistance can take various forms, but can be interpreted 
broadly as financial transfers, trade preferences or technical assistance. Developed 
countries may seek to interpret CBDR commitments more narrowly as only technical 
  18assistance related to the sustainable development implications of environmental 
commitments.  
These various interpretations of CBDR are central to China’s participation in the 
post Bali negotiation as they determine the broad contours for the more detailed 
negotiation to follow. China, India, and other developing countries were not included 
in agreed numerical limits on emissions in the Kyoto Protocol, in part because they 
were viewed as not being the main contributors to the greenhouse gas emissions 
during the pre-treaty industrialization period. It was also because of the 
acknowledgement by developed countries that developing countries’ need for growth 
and development has to be weighted alongside environmental commitments. CBDR 
thus seemingly endorses the important distinction between emissions that China 
creates to develop and Western’s mature or luxury emissions, and implies developing 
countries’ rights to growth and development to achieve income levels comparable to 
those to OECD.   
CBDR also seemingly implies different commitments by parties to the 
negotiation, independently of financial compensation. Thus, one outcome consistent 
with CBDR would be that OECD countries take on commitments on reductions of 
emission levels, while China, India, Russia and Brazil take on commitments on 
reductions in emissions intensity relative to GDP. Also if China and other lower 
income countries can establish that they have rights granted by UNCCD and the terms 
of the Kyoto Protocol to achieve growth and development comparable to that of the 
OECD before taking any environment obligation, then China would seemingly have 
to be financially compensated for any environmental restraint they accept. This would 
suggest large and significant transfers being made to China as part of participation if it 
can be established that growth levels in China are significantly lower by 
commitments. 
In the Copenhagen negotiations, it will also be argued by China and other 
developing countries that the Kyoto Protocol only relates to actions up to 2012 and 
establishes no precedents beyond 2012. New arrangements consistent with CBDR will 
be argued for. Under CBDR, China could still take on similar emission reductions 
  19commitments to OECD countries, but would likely only do so if financial 
compensation and technical assistance was agreed and with China’s current growth 
profile the compensation would presumably be large. With the four pillar structure 
agreed for the Post Bali roadmap process, the adaptation and innovation funds 
effectively act as a system of payments implying side financial compensation. This 
structure could thus be the basis for a concrete interpretation of what CBDR means 
also in terms of financial transfers. 
 
4.2 The choice of negotiating instruments 
A further central issue for China is the choice of negotiating instruments. These 
relate to the agreed mechanisms to be used to reduce carbon emissions, what are to be 
the base target years and what form commitments take. China’s commitments 
regarding emissions could comprise a package of policies and measures more so than 
a single target. 
 
4.2.1 Emission intensity versus emission targets 
Absolute emissions targets involve the amount of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases produced and target for reductions by some specified date relative 
to a base date. These mechanisms were used in Kyoto and also widely used in other 
protocol and treaty arrangements. The target date for Copenhagen commitments is at 
this point imprecise. In the G8, there has been discussion of 50% cuts by 2050. 
Chancellor inertial has also been associated with targets for maximum temperature 
change (2℃) by 2050. 2050 targets might also be accompanied by intermediate targets, 
say 30% cut by 2030, and a 20% cut by 2020. 
Relative emissions intensity targets focus on the amount of emissions relative to 
some unit of economic output, usually stated in dollar or local currency terms. 
Intensity targets can be interpreted as performance standards. For a company, targets 
maybe relative to company total sales or relative to units of a good produced. For a 
country, emissions intensity is typically calculated as tons of carbon dioxide relative 
to the country’s GDP. The choice of exchange rate if emissions intensities across 
  20countries are converted into tons of carbon per dollar of GDP becomes a critical issue. 
This is especially important for China due to large differences in China’s dollar 
measure of GDP depending upon whether or not purchasing power exchange rates are 
used.  
While departures from emission level targets may be viewed as inconsistent with 
arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol, there is no reason in principle why the form 
that targets take can not be changed from one environmental negotiation to the other, 
as has occurred with tariff commitments in GATT/WTO across trade rounds. Also 
Pizer (2005) has argued that absolute emissions targets are be too constraining in face 
of unexpectedly high growth and too lax in face of unexpectedly low growth, and that 
intensity targets better accommodate unexpected growth.   
For China, using emissions level targets with rapid economic growth can quickly 
lead to higher costs, even if new, low-carbon technologies are developed and 
deployed, while intensity targets may not—making intensity targets more attractive 
for China in the near term (Ellerman and Wing, 2003). Also since 1980 Chinese 
emissions intensity has been declining (see Figure 1)considerably faster than that of 
the US and the EU and is forecast to continue to do so with predicted declining energy 
intensity (Hu Xiulian, 2005).   
Shifting negotiations toward intensity targets for China may also make 
negotiations easier by allowing a range of variants on the central target—including 
slowing, stopping, and reversing emissions growth—to be discussed. The 
conventional belief however, remains that intensity levels are difficult to compare 
across countries due to the issue of at which exchange rates to use, and specifically 
purchasing power parity exchange rates. Ahmad (2005) shows how the use of the 
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Source: Ning Zeng & Jiahua Pan (2008) 
4.2.2 Annual or cumulative emissions 
Another key negotiating issue in the Post-Bali process for China is whether 
emissions are to be calculated on an annual or cumulative basis. Over the last century, 
China has contributed only 8% of global emissions, while the U.S. with far fewer 
people has emitted over 4 times the cumulative CO2 emissions of China during 
1900-2005(see Table 3). Estimates by the World Energy Agency are that around 60% 
of the global increase in emissions in 2006-2030 will come from China & India, but 
their total cumulative emissions till 2030 are still behind U.S. and EU (see Table 3).   
If we instead focus on annual emissions in 2004(Table 1) and take expected 
incremental emissions between 2006 and 2030 (Table 3), Chinese emissions will be 
significantly greater than these of the U.S. and EU in this period, despite per capita 
emissions by China remaining below them.   
Table 3 Cumulative Emissions by Country (1990-2030) 




% in cumulative global 
emission (1990-2005) 
Predicted cumulative carbon 
emissions (2006-2030)   
(Billion tones) 
U.S. 320  30%  160 
EU-25 250  23%  90 
Japan 50  4%  30 
China 90  8%  230 
India 25  2%  55 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2007   
  22These data also imply that actions necessary to limit emission will not be 
achieved without cooperation among all large emitters, especially China and India, as 
their incremental emissions from 2006 through 2030 are likely to be as large as those 
from EU and the United States (see Difiglio, 2007). Thus, from a negotiating point of 
view China has an incentive to make the argument that whatever emissions targets are 
agreed to as part of the Copenhagen process (and whether they involve absolute or 
relative targets) they should be based on cumulative emissions by countries over long 
periods of time, and not on the current annual flow of emissions. 
 
4.2.3 The choice of base year and length of commitment 
Another set of issues central to China is the choice of base year for emission 
reductions and the length of any commitment period implied by the choice of the 
target year. For China, it makes a significant difference how long the commitment 
period is. The choice of base date is critically important in different ways for different 
countries.  
Under the Kyoto Protocol emissions levels in the 'base year' are the starting 
points for tracking of domestic emissions for countries for their emissions reduction 
target. The base year is not a 'year' per se, but the emission level from which emission 
reductions will take place. In case of EU, the EU-27 does not have a Kyoto target and 
an aggregated base year. For carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide 1990 is used 
as the 'base year' for all EU-15 Member States. But for fluorinated gases, the EU-15 
Member States can choose to use the emission levels in 1995 instead. Twelve of the 
15 Member States have chosen to use 1995 as their base year for fluorinated gas 
emissions. In practice, EU-15 base-year emissions can be considered close to 1990 
emissions.  
Russia for instance, has already indicated their negotiating position to maintain 
1990 as the “base year”, because of the negative growth in Russia between 1990 and 
1998 makes it much easier to meet emission reduction targets (Figure 2). Used of this 
year, on the other hand, for China, would be a major negative given the rapid growth 
which has occurred since the 1990s.   














Source: China Data from National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook;   
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At this point in the negotiation the target year remains unclear. The G8 
discussion of a 50% reduction by 2050 points to a long commitment period. This 
could be accompanied by intermediate commitments such as by 2020 or by 2030. The 
longer the timeframe, the larger the negotiating leverage for China given her growth. 
But equally, the longer the period, the more uncertainty as to cost will be associated 
with commitments to emission levels. 
 
4.2.4 Innovation and transfer of technology
The post Bali Roadmap process establishes two further negotiations on 
adaptation and innovation, but both of which involve the establishment of funds. The 
size of the funds and the criteria to be established for their use and administration are 
key issues for China. Under the Copenhagen mandate, the following items are 
negotiable: technology diffusion, technology deployment, technology transfer, 
technology development and joint technology development. The issue is to precisely 
define these terms, and in ways which lead to negotiable instruments and concrete 
agreements. Given its current stage of development, China needs new technologies 
that can provide for emission reductions in energy and carbon intensive industries in 
the chemical, steel and concrete sectors. Technological advances are also required in 
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capture and storage. In tackling climate change and reducing emissions, technology is 
not a solution in itself, but it is an important means to the end.   
Development and transfer of technology has been, and is, one of the most 
difficult issues related to climate change to negotiate on. The COP14 established a 
consultative process to find a meaningful framework for development and transfer of 
technologies under Article 4.5 of the Convention. During the consultative process it 
became clear that developing countries may also have to contribute to the 
development and transfer of technology. It is also clear that technology transfer under 
the Convention is quite different from transfers in open markets and distinct from 
technology transfer that may occur under a CDM project. Technology transfer is, 
however, aimed at providing opportunities for the private sector to access better 
technologies leading to GHG emission reductions and also higher production. 
Negotiating the provision of relevant technical information is seen as one avenue for 
China to take, but for now, negotiating concrete aids in this area seems lacking. 
Another set of issues raised involve special rules on Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR). The question being whether special IPR arrangements in the context of climate 
change are needed remains. What special arrangements might be and how they would 
operate is unclear. It is also under how the WTO TRIPS agreement can be amended 
without the participation of the WTO. These issues need to be addressed by parties in 
the two year negotiating process up to Copenhagen. Developing countries like China 
need to be able to use the best available technology to adapt to climate change to 
further damage. They don’t want to have to rely solely on open source technologies, 
but be able to access patented technologies in a flexible and affordable manner 
(Sabina and Oxfam, 2008). How such arrangements are worked out is clearly 
problematic, as has been also seen in the HIV/AIDS area. 
Other issues include facilitating changes in technology, the role of tacit 
knowledge in the transfer of technologies and the role of subsidies in technology, 
trade, and sustainable development negotiations. In any discussion of the development 
and dissemination of environmentally friendly technology, it seems unavoidable to 
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(NTBs) and impede the flow of technology across borders. Developing countries, 
which often lack the resources to provide subsidies, may seek financial support for 
transfer of certain technologies.   
In the Post Bali process, the focus is on a new technology fund and on the size 
and administration of such fund. The perceived need for China is to negotiate 
arrangements for specific industries and technologies according to China’s stage of 
development. However, China is also not clear exactly what its technological 
requirements are, and does not have clear knowledge of the technologies that are 
needed.  
 
4.2.5 Accompanying funds and financing 
Financial transfers to China will aid in achieving emission reductions and act as 
compensation for any environmental restraint that China agrees. These are thus 
central to China’s post-Bali negotiating position. It is also argued that compensation 
payments will raise the participation of developing countries by lowering their 
marginal abatement costs (Eyckmans & Michael, 2003). In order to reach an 
agreement in Copenhagen, developing countries like China will almost certainly call 
on developed countries to finance technology transfer, this will include well-governed, 
adequate, predictable and sustainable funds.         
Independently of the post Bali process, the World Bank plans to establish a 
portfolio of climate investment funds (CIFs). Transfer thus is mainly on the basis of 
joint initiatives of the US, UK and Japan. One of those funds is the Clean Technology 
Fund. But the CIFs largely focus on mitigation, not on adaptation technologies and are 
to provide loans as well as grants to eligible developing countries. There are also 
‘sunset clauses’ proposed for the CIFs, a tying the CIFs’ termination to the creation of   
financial mechanisms under the UNFCCC. They are thus seen as interim measures to 
assist in filling immediate financing gaps with the insertion of ‘specific sunset 
clauses” linked to agreement on a future climate change regime. There is no fixed date 
for the cessation of the CIFs, rendering the existence of a ‘sunset clause’ vague.   
  26For China, it will be a priority that efforts be focused on developing genuine 
multilateral and bilateral funds. Multilateral funds would give developing countries 
representation and voice within the global governance structure and ensure that 
resources for climate change are used in accordance with internationally agreed 
principles and meet the objectives of the multilateral climate change regime (Sabina 
and Oxfam, 2008). Management and coordination of multilateral funds are more 
difficult. Bilateral funds are more manageable, but are often small and hence limited 
in what they can achieve.   
During a roundtable discussion in Bonn on June 3, 2008 (Bonn Climate Change 
Talks, Zou Ji, 2008), China proposed setting up a multilateral technology acquisition 
fund for climate technologies and argued that the fund could be based on a public 
private partnership work to financing the development, diffusion and transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies by linking private and public financing. It was 
also argued that financial transfer to China need to be tied to the speed of emission 
reductions, giving incentives to China to achieve such reductions (Kiang and Guan, 
2007). China could use such incentives at firm level and also tie them to FDI 
approvals. Funding for dealing in China with climate change would need to come 
from the national budget and specialist funds.   
In October 2007, China also approved the establishment of a Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) fund. By the end of the same month, the National Development 
and Reform Commission had already approved 885 CDM projects. If all of these 
projects are implemented, total emissions reductions due to CDM projects in China 
will total 1.5 billion tones, and cost US$15 billion. Over US$3 billion of this will go 
into a China CDM Fund. This provides a starting point for funding targeted 
specifically at tackling climate change. These will need to go well beyond Bali 
process for the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).   
 
4.3 Non-compliance with Kyoto targets and coalition activity in Copenhagen   
A further issue for China in Post-Bali negotiation and seemingly central to the 
Chinese position concerns the likely non-compliance with Kyoto reduction targets by 
  27a number of OECD economies. In aggregate, the parties of Kyoto Protocol will likely 
meet their emission reduction targets, but this is in large part because of the 
substantial compliance by Russia because of the sharply negative growth between 
1990, 1991 and 1997, 1998(Figure 2). Individually, a number of key OECD countries 




11 which have each increased emissions by 
as much as 30% over their target decrease by the end of 2012. For these countries 
such as Canada, this could imply larger commitment being made to implement Kyoto 
commitments than commitments possibly undertaken as part of the post Bali and 
Copenhagen processes.   
In turn, a related issue is the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the Kyoto 
Protocol under the first round of negotiations. Kyoto doesn’t set out a procedure for 
determining non-compliance (which is a huge problem). In UNFCCC, Most of their 
300 people spend their time monitoring data form countries as to what their emissions 
actually are. They consult, examine data, comment and make repeated visits. But at 
the end of the day there is no mechanism for determining exactly what emissions are 
and so it will not be possible under Kyoto for there to be a clear determination as to 
who has met which target and by how much. 
This non-compliance and non-enforcement with Kyoto targets represents both 
major problems for the negotiation and posed issues for china in the development of 
negotiating positions. In Bali conference, when the draft summit text asked 
developing countries to make "measurable, reportable and verifiable" cuts in their 
greenhouse emissions, China and the G77 (a coalition of 132 developing countries) 
                                                 
9 Spain and Portugal had targets of an 8% decrease, but both have increased emissions by about 40%. 
10 Australia was granted a limitation of an 8% increase which is specified in Article 4, section 8(h) of 
the Convention, but only ratified on 3 December 2007 by the new government and took effect in March, 
2008. Analysis has projected Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions at 109% of the 1990 emissions level 
over the period 2008–2012, calculated including the effects of Land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF). This is slightly above its 108% Kyoto Protocol limitation. As of 2007, the UNFCCC is 
reporting that Australia's 2004 greenhouse gas emissions were at 125.6% of 1990 levels, calculated 
without the LULUCF correction.   
11 On December 17, 2002, Canada ratified the treaty that came into force in February 2005, requiring it 
to reduce emissions to 6% below 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 commitment periods. As of 2003, 
the federal government claimed to have spent or committed 3.7 billion dollars on climate change 
programmes. By 2004, CO2 emissions had risen to 27% above 1990 levels (which compares 
unfavorably to the 16% increase in emissions by the United States during that time).   
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"measurable, reportable and verifiable" and China's commitment, along with other 
developing countries, to discuss adopting "measurable, reportable and verifiable" 
measures to slow its emissions is not equivalent to developed nations' undertakings on 
binding emissions cuts. In Copenhagen, we can imagine that China’s argument will 
still likely be that negotiation on future emission reductions is simply not credible 
negotiation if targets for the first-round commitments have not been honored.   
It is true that there is no enforcement mechanism in Kyoto but here is a provision 
for carrying forward of any deficit to future negotiations and this has a penalty factor 
which increases the carrying forward by a further 30%. Hence, the argument for 
countries in the position of non-compliance with targets from first round would be to 
find some mechanism to meet these targets as well as taking on fresh commitments as 
part of Bali and Copenhagen process. From a Chinese perspective, the focus on 
effective enforcement mechanisms in the negotiation must be a significant element of 
the negotiation process.    
Another issue concerns individual country targets and the EU binding 
commitment targets. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU is required to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 8 per cent from 1990 levels during the first commitment 
period from 2008 to 2012. Member States’ commitments of minus 8 per cent in 
Annex B of the treaty were amended in an EU burden sharing agreement to give 
national targets (see Table 4). Within the shared Kyoto target, each EU-15 Member 
State has a differentiated emissions target. The 12 new EU Member States are not part 
of the joint EU-15 target but all, except Cyprus and Malta, have individual targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol (see Table 5). 
But for all their intense activity such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
12, 
countries are finding it challenging to implement the EU Directive (Table 5). Practical 
problems remain over data availability, capacity and timing (RIIA Report, 2003).   
                                                 
12 EU Emissions Trading Scheme is the European Union's climate change policy tool, which helps 
industries to cut their CO2 emissions in a cost-effective way. It requires a cap on emissions for all large 
CO2 emission sources. In the EU-15, the ETS is estimated to cut 3.4 % from base-year emissions. 
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(% change in emissions for 2008–12 relative to 1990 base-year levels)
13
 
Country  Phase 1 Emission reductions targets 
EU*   -8% 
US   -7% 
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland    -6% 
Croatia   -5% 
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine    0 
Norway   1% 
Australia   8% 
Iceland   10% 
Notes: EU includes EU-15, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland.   
Source: UNFCCC
 
Table 5 EU Member States’ Individual Kyoto Targets and the Projected 
Gap with GHG Emission in 2010
14
 
EU Member states  Individual Kyoto Targets
Gap between Kyoto commitments 
and projected GHGs in 2010* 
Germany -21  -12.7 
Sweden 4  -3.3 
UK -12.5  -1.4 
Denmark -21  3.4 
Greece 25  3.9 
luxembourg -28  5.1 
France 0  9 
Netherlands -6  12.1 
Italy -6.5    14.6 
Finland 0  16.6 
Belgium -7.5  22.9 
Austria -13  24.5 
Ireland 13  26.8 
Portugal 27  31.1 
Spain 15  33.3 
 
Note*: Negative figures represent over-delivery, positive figures show shortfall from emissions target.   
Source: Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) Report 2003 
                                                 
13 These targets, which range from –8% to +10%, represent either an outright cut in emissions levels for 
industralised countries, or a lower level increase from current levels compared to an expected 'business 
as usual' scenario for less developed countries. 
14 See RIIA Report 2003 Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1. 
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Commission first negotiates a target(say 10% cut) and then under burden sharing 
arrangements these get translated into higher targets for some and lower targets for 
others(say 5%,15%). As a result both EU and individual country targets exist. Both 
are in the treaty as both are signatories. Another possibility could be that the parties to 
the Bali and Copenhagen make commitments to funds to be held in central account by 
an international agency. At the end of the commitment period, if commitments were 
not be horned, the funds of those countries violating their commitments will not be 
returned to those countries, and would instead been divided between those countries 
whose commitments had been met. The majority of the funds would come from the 
OECD countries, given the sharp differences in income well and capital. 
As long as the key negotiation issues concern under matters, China, India and 
Brazil may have the common interest of not having being in participation in the first 
round of negotiations and seeking to have growth and development and hence 
negotiation on emission intensity. They also will jointly focus on the issue of 
compliance, and dealing with non-compliance and effective dispute settlement 
procedures. All of these will be central issues for China in dealing with the countries 
participated in the Kyoto negotiation given that China had taken no commitments. 
 
4.4 Other issues concerning China’s participation 
The Chinese negotiation position post Bali will also reflect domestic policy 
initiatives. China is now renewing emission related potential damage from global 
warming and taking own internal measures to reduce the contributions China makes 
to global damage through incremental growth of emissions. So, how China wants to 
go in any unilateral measures and related questions of the costs involved for China 
incline to global emission targets is the issue. Actually, there is a long way to go for 
China, and the most difficult part still remains actual implementation of 
environmental policy. So far, China has been successful in creating an environmental 
apparatus and has issued environmental policies, laws and regulations. Where it has 
not been successful is in carrying out policies—there is still a big gap between words 
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implementation of policies and enforcement of legislation should be a priority both 
for the Chinese authorities and the UN bodies engaged in environmental efforts in 
China (Gørild and Ellen, 2007). 
A related issue is how other parties grant credit for unilateral actions in the 
multilateral Copenhagen negotiation. China’s commitment to a 20% reduction in 
energy consumption relative to GDP by 2020 and a 20% target for use of renewable 
from current of 1% of energy consumption figure are the issue. To some extent, these 
unilateral measures can be viewed as instruments which can be used to meet 
multilateral agreed targets, but on the other hand, multilateral targets in emission 
reduction intensity are different, hence China can be argued to be given some degree 
of credits for such commitments, particularly commitments on renewable. How that is 
done and how the credit will be given need negotiation in the round. 
Furthermore, how to maintain openness to markets is also a central issue given 
the pressures now emerging from Europe and else where for systems of adjustments 
to company significant global environmental commitments. These are based on the 
argument that environmental commitments raises the cost for domestic producers who 
need to have offsetting adjustments involving tariff on import and export subsidies. 
The prospect for China therefore is a global structure in which global markets 
potentially become closed as environmental commitments are undertaken to offset the 
cost implications for the domestic producers. How China deals with non 
environmental but environment induced difficulty is crucial for China. This is also 
potentially a major negative for China through export growth and FDI impacts linked 
to these form of trade measures tied to global environmental arguments (see also 
Lochood & Whalley 2008).   
  325. Concluding remarks and implications for China’s participation in 
global environmental negotiations beyond Copenhagen 
In this paper, we discuss a range of issues concerning China’s participation in 
Post-Bali process One is that a interpretation of CBDR which reflects developing 
countries’ desire to leave room to grow will be needed for the negotiation to be 
fruitful. Another is that choices of instruments will be central in the negotiation. 
Emission intensity, effective technology transfer and financial support and other 
related issues will be raised by China. Also non-compliance and collative activities 
will be issues for the Post-Bali process and need to be dealt with in the negotiation.   
Globally, we see an emerging structure of a sequence of global environmental 
negotiations which has parallels to trade negotiations in the GATT and WTO. In the 
WTO case, the ninth rounds of negotiation of GATT/WTO negotiations since 1947 
have sequentially moved forward. In the environmental area, we effectively have two 
rounds negotiation from Kyoto to Bali and Copenhagen. Seemingly inevitably these 
negotiations will continue with deeper and deeper commitments and the emergence of 
a more global environmental regime. This global environmental regime is in our view 
likely to be increasingly linked to other dimensions of international policy coordinated 
with trade and finance. The result may eventually be linked negotiations between 
trade, finance and environment, and even potentially a new institution format that 
goes beyond the current WTO structure and the patchwork quilt of arrangements in 
the environmental area. For China, therefore, the prospect is of ongoing negotiations 
after the Bali and Copenhagen which broadly expand on the existing coverage and 
commitments and also growing linkage to trade and finance. Eventually linkage could 
be such as to yield a new global organization or body. What the broadening of these 
negotiations will be at this point is hard to say but could include broadening to other 
environmental issues including biodiversity and other matters added into broadened 
climate change negotiations. It could also involve broadening to energy and energy 
security issues, including nuclear and other matters. The positions that China takes on 
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negotiating rounds.   
On the broadening of coverage and linkage to trade and finance, the issues here 
basically reflect the time warp that global institutional structure of policy coordination 
currently find itself in. Since the Breton Wood Conference in 1944, through trade and 
finance arrangements in the GATT/WTO and in the IMF, global activities have been 
based on the premise that the only links between national economies care those 
involved in the trade and finance in physical linkage. These physical linkages are now 
the global emissions which are to be addressed through climate change and global 
environmental negotiations. The prospect therefore is eventually one of environmental 
negotiation growing in significance and linkage will thus likely become lager and 
larger, to the point that these separate negotiations eventually become directly linked.   
From China’s point of view, linkage is central because the need to maintain 
growth and development policy is orientated to growth based on trade and FDI. At the 
same time, commitments made on global environmental negotiations will be central to 
this. In turn, China will have major role to play in any institutional evolution. There 
are now arguments being made that the World Trade Organizations are viewed not as 
a bargaining organization just on trade policy, but effectively a photo type of a global 
bargaining organization worldwide for all forms of policy coordination including 
environmental area (Whalley, 2008). Hence the World Trade Organization may 
evolve as a World Bargaining Organization which encompasses environmental 
bargaining as well as trade bargaining. China’s participation in the potential 
emergence of such an organization may thus also be on issue in current global 
environmental negotiations.   
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